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Black Like Me: The Free Speech
Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas
Steven B. Lichtman*
ABSTRACT
As arguably the most ferocious conservative on the Supreme Court,
Clarence Thomas is not usually associated with civil liberties causes,
except insofar as popular myth portrays him as hostile to those causes.
Contrary to this mythology, however, Thomas has carved out a
definitively speech-protective path in his First Amendment opinions.
While there have been some notable exceptions, it can be argued that
Clarence Thomas is the most pronounced free speech absolutist on the
Supreme Court since Hugo Black, who famously (if somewhat
apocryphally) believed that "no law means no law" when it comes to the
First Amendment.
This article will track Justice Thomas' free speech jurisprudence,
with an eye on observing how it has changed-or remained constant-
over time. Specific attention will be paid to Thomas' quarrels with the
majority's compromise approaches to contemporary free speech
controversies such as commercial speech and campaign finance
regulation, and to his insistence that the free speech clause tolerates little
in the way of even incremental restrictions on expression. Along the
way, the paper will systematically compare Thomas' overall theory of
what free speech means to the approaches to the subject taken by other
Justices and theorists.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Shippensburg University. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the New England Political
Science Association, Portland, ME, May 8, 2009. The author would like to thank Ken
Kersch for his helpful comments and suggestions during the NEPSA panel, and William
Thro for his valued insights and counsel.
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"It is my belief that there ARE absolutes in our Bill ofRights, and that
they were put there by men who knew what words meant, and meant
their prohibitions to be absolute."
Justice Hugo Black
Madison Lecture, New York University School of Law
February 17, 1960
INTRODUCTION
For one of the most scrutinized and psychoanalyzed figures in
Supreme Court history, Clarence Thomas has inspired a startling paucity
of writing about his jurisprudence. While there have been biographies of
Justice Thomas' (and one autobiography),2 narratives of his confirmation
hearings, and accounts of his symbolic place in contemporary American
1. See, e.g., KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE
DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS (2007); KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS (2004); JOHN L. COOPER, THE PRINCE AND THE PAUPER:
THE CASE AGAINST CLARENCE THOMAS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
(2001); JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS STORY (2001); ANDREW
PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY (2001).
2. See CLARENCE THOMAS, My GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR (2007).
3. See, e.g., JANE FLAX, THE AMERICAN DREAM IN BLACK AND WHITE: THE
CLARENCE THOMAS HEARINGS (1999); JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE
JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRITICAL
JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE IMPACT OF CLARENCE THOMAS
(1993); TIMOTHY B. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES: CLARENCE THOMAS,
ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION (1992).
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politics, 4 he has inspired comparatively little in the way of book-length
exploration of his judicial philosophy,s despite being on the Court now
for over seventeen years. Much of this limited treatment of his
jurisprudence that does exist, furthermore, appeared several years ago;
there seems to be only one study of Thomas' jurisprudence that covers
his recent output.6
The scholarship on Thomas is complicated, meanwhile, by its tone.
Little of the writing aspires to neutrality; much of it is either hagiography
or polemic. Henry Mark Holzer's analysis of Thomas's opinions is
subtitled "A Conservative's Perspective," leaving a reader little doubt of
what the author's take on the opinions will be. On the other end of the
spectrum, accounts of Thomas which purport to make "the case against"
him,7 or hold him up as emblematic of "the failure of constitutional
conservatives,' or insist that he should be impeached for perjuring
himself during his confirmation hearings,9 similarly fail to provide
reliably detached analysis.
The story of Clarence Thomas is told somewhat more
comprehensively in the law reviews. There are a host of articles that
place Thomas in a subject-specific context, such as race,o federalism,"
the Guantanamo detentions,12 and criminal justice,13 as well as a handful
of intriguing articles about Thomas' overall jurisprudential philosophy. 14
4. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH AND JOYCE BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE
THOMAS: CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY (2000); RONALD
SURESH ROBERTS, CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE TOUGH LOVE CROWD: COUNTERFEIT
HEROES AND UNHAPPY TRUTHS (1994).
5. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (1999); SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON, ORIGINAL SIN: CLARENCE THOMAS
AND THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES (2002).
6. See HENRY MARK HOLZER, KEEPER OF THE FLAME: THE SUPREME COURT
OPINIONS OF CLARENCE THOMAS 1991-2006: A CONSERVATIVE'S PERSPECTIVE (2007).
7. See COOPER, supra note 1.
8. See MARCOSSON, supra note 5.
9. See SMITH & BAUGH, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence
Thomas, Affirmative Action and the Treachery of Originalism: "The Sun Don't Shine
Here in this Part of Town," 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2005); Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us
About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931 (2005); Mark Tushnet,
Clarence Thomas's Black Nationalism, 47 How. L.J. 323 (2004).
11. See David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's
Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339 (1996).
12. See Christopher E. Smith & Cheryl D. Lema, Justice Clarence Thomas and
Incommunicado Detention: Justifications and Risks, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 783 (2005).
13. See Eric L. Muller, Where, But For the Grace of God, Goes He? The Search
For Empathy In the Criminal Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 15 CONST. COMMENT.
225 (1998).
14. See Kendall Thomas, Reading Clarence Thomas, 18 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 224
(2004); Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Originalism: Clarence
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Yet it is still surprising for such a polarizing figure to have aroused a
relatively small amount of appraisals of his work.'5
Perhaps most surprisingly, there does not seem to be a
comprehensive examination of Thomas' work on freedom of speech.
The reason this is a surprise is that in his years on the Court, Thomas has
emerged as a distinctive and interesting voice on free expression. While
he is often disparaged as merely a clone-or a puppet-of his fellow
conservative Antonin Scalia, the picture of Clarence Thomas that
emerges over time is one that evinces significant variance between him
and Scalia, or for that matter between him and any one of his colleagues
on the contemporary Court.16
Thomas at the Rubicon, 16 LAW & INEQ. 429 (1998); Christopher E. Smith, Clarence
Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1997).
15. Specific assessments of Thomas in political science journals mostly deal with the
mechanics of his confirmation. See Vincent L. Hutchings, Political Context, Issue
Salience, and Selective Attentiveness: Constituent Knowledge of the Clarence Thomas
Confirmation Vote, 63 J. POL. 846 (2001); L. Martin Overby, Beth M. Henschen, Michael
H. Walsh, & Julie Strauss, Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate
Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, 86 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 997 (1992);
Martin Shefter, Institutional Conflict Over Presidential Appointments: The Case of
Clarence Thomas, 25.4 PoL. SCI. & POL. 676 (1992); Lee Sigelman & James S. Todd,
Clarence Thomas, Black Pluralism, and Civil Rights Policy, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 231 (1992).
For public reaction to his confirmation, see Dianne Rucinski, A Review: Rush To
Judgment? Fast Reaction Polls in the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Controversy, 57 PUB.
OPINION Q. 575 (1993); Dan Thomas, Craig McCoy, & Allan McBride, Deconstructing
the Political Spectacle: Sex, Race, and Subjectivity in Public Response to the Clarence
Thomas/Anita Hill 'Sexual Harassment' Hearings, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 699 (1993). For
discussion on how his nomination affected the 1992 elections, see Thomas P. Kim,
Clarence Thomas and the Politicization of Candidate Gender in the 1992 Senate
Elections, 23 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 399 (1998); Robin M. Wolpert & James G. Gimpel,
Information, Recall, and Accountability: The Electorate's Response to the Clarence
Thomas Nomination, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 535 (1997). There are isolated articles in
political science journals which take on Thomas' performance on the bench. See
Rudolph Alexander, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas' First Year on the U.S. Supreme Court:
A Reason for African-Americans to be Concerned, 27 J. BLACK STUD. 378 (1997). For
the most part, these journals will leave jurisprudential analysis to law reviews.
16. If anything, Thomas' iconoclasm seems to be increasing, generally speaking. In
two high-profile cases at the end of the 2008-2009 Term, Thomas found himself
occupying a position which attracted no other votes. On June 22, in Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009), the Court unanimously held that
the Texas district should have a greater opportunity to demonstrate that the preclearance
provisions of the Voting Rights Act should not apply to it. Thomas was the only Justice
arguing directly that § 5 of the Act be stricken as unconstitutional; while his colleagues
all noticed problems with this part of the law, none but Thomas were willing to raise
comprehensive objections. Id. at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). Three days later, in Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129
S. Ct. 2633 (2009), Thomas was the only Justice arguing for the constitutionality of a
school's strip-search of a teenage girl (in a search for ibuprofen tablets the girl was
rumored to be hiding).
. Northwest Austin and Safford are the latest examples in a skyrocketing trend: the
increasing number of times Clarence Thomas finds himself alone in dissent. In his first
418 [Vol. I114:2
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Indeed, one has to go back in time to find a true analog to Clarence
Thomas on the subject of speech. The singular distinguishing
characteristic of Thomas' free speech jurisprudence has been a mostly
uncompromising absolutism on the meaning of the First Amendment and
how little leeway it affords government to finesse its protections, even at
the margins. Where his contemporaries on the Court are perhaps too
willing to fashion compromises or tolerate corner-cutting on free speech,
Thomas positions himself as a stubborn and even iconoclastic dogmatist.
He disposes of artificial distinctions that strike him both as intellectually
bankrupt and stealthily enabling of governmental regulation of speech
through a side door.
In these respects, the other Supreme Court Justice that Clarence
Thomas most resembles is Hugo Black. At least until the very end of his
career, Black was a boisterous advocate of the limitlessness of the First
Amendment, which in his eyes defied any governmental attempt to place
any restriction on speech, no matter how incremental or allegedly
necessary it might be. Black eloquently disseminated his philosophy on
speech many times and in many fora. In his dissent in Beauharnais v.
Illinoisl7 (joined by his good friend William 0. Douglas), Black angrily
criticized the majority's recognition of the concept of group libel as a
dangerous precedent that could empower government to criminalize any
differences of political opinion:
To say that a legislative body can, with this Court's approval, make it
a crime to petition for and publicly discuss proposed legislation
seems as farfetched to me as it would be to say that a valid law could
be enacted to punish a candidate for President for telling the people
his views. I think the First Amendment, with the Fourteenth,
"absolutely" forbids such laws without any "ifs" or "buts" or
"whereases." Whatever the danger, if any, in such public
discussions, it is a danger the Founders deemed outweighed by the
danger incident to the stifling of thought and speech. The Court
[today] does not act on this view of the Founders. It calculates what
it deems to be the danger of public discussion, holds the scales are
tipped on the side of state suppression, and upholds state
censorship.
Black restated his absolutism eight years later, in an even broader form.
Invited to give the inaugural Madison Lecture at New York University
School of Law, Black used the occasion to remind his listeners of why he
fifteen years on the Court, through the end of the 2005-2006 Term, Thomas issued twelve
solo dissents. But in the last three Terms, Thomas has issued another ten solo dissents.
17. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
18. Id. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting).
4192009]
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continued to argue for "total incorporation" of the Bill of Rights. While
his Court colleagues clung to the vision that the Fourteenth Amendment
only made portions of the Bill of Rights binding upon the states, Black
insisted that the entire Bill of Rights was made applicable to the states.
His absolutism about the nature of rights in general was a natural
hothouse for the development of his absolutism about speech in
particular:
It is my belief that there are "absolutes" in our Bill of Rights, and
that they were put there by men who knew what words meant, and
meant their prohibitions to be "absolute." . . . The historical and
practical purposes of a Bill of Rights, the very use of a written
constitution ... all point to the creation of a government which was
denied all power to do some things under any and all circumstances,
and all power to do other things except in the manner prescribed. 19
Black's embrace of free speech was so all-encompassing in fact, that in
an interview two years after the Madison Lecture, he suggested that the
First Amendment even safeguarded libel and slander.2 0 As one of the
biographies of Black has put it, to Black "[t]he First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech was much more than 'an admonition'; it was a
categorical command to government to leave the people alone!,21
This article will show how Clarence Thomas' free speech
jurisprudence is a descendant of Black's absolutist free speech tradition,
albeit with some points of dissonance. There are some subject areas in
which Black and Thomas overlap, most notably the First Amendment's
applicability to students. But what makes the parallels between Black
and Thomas so interesting is that for the most part, Thomas is applying
his absolutist free speech principles in subject areas which Black never
had occasion to contemplate, such as commercial speech and campaign
finance. Even though Thomas is working in a set of worlds to which
Black was rarely or never exposed, the free speech outlook which
backstops his legal conclusions in those areas owes quite a lot to his
legendary predecessor.
19. Hugo L. Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960).
20. See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 513 (1994). Black would
give voice to this sentiment in 1964, in his concurrence in New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). Noting that "state libel laws threaten the very existence of an
American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold
enough to criticize the conduct of public officials," Black declared that "the Federal
Constitution has dealt with this deadly danger to the press in the only way possible
without leaving the free press open to destruction-by granting the press an absolute
immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public duty." Id. at 295
(Black, J., concurring).
21. HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK,
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 138 (1992).
420 [Vol. 114:2
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While it is easy to point out the philosophical similarities between
Black's and Thomas' approach to free speech, it is a little more difficult
to place Thomas in the broader continuum of free speech theory. After
delineating Thomas' positions in several hot-button areas of free speech
in the first stages of this article, the article will then proceed to show that
Thomas does not fit precisely into any of the traditional understandings
of what free speech is, what it does, and how it works. Classical
formulations of free speech include the belief that it is designed to
facilitate democratic decisionmaking,2 2 or to enable individual self-
fulfillment,2 3 or to prevent mainstream ideas from overrunning new or
dissident ideas.24 Clarence Thomas' version of free speech cannot be
inserted comfortably within any of these formulations; he seems to
derive more inspiration from Ayn Rand or F.A. Hayek than from
Alexander Meiklejohn or Thomas Emerson. Despite his marked
similarities to Hugo Black, Clarence Thomas is a true free speech
original.
CLARENCE THOMAS ON SPEECH: THE DATA
Beginning with his first published opinion for the Court, released on
January 14, 1992,25 Clarence Thomas has written a total of 432 opinions
through the end of the 2008-09 Term, and has written the Opinion of
Court 149 times (an average 8.76 Opinions of the Court per Term, which
is the lowest rate of any current Justice with at least five years'
service). 26 Out of his 432 opinions, thirty-one of them are speech cases,
listed in the table on the following page. Five of his speech opinions are
main opinions, sixteen are concurrences, seven are dissents (two of these
are from denials of certiorari), and three are concurrences-in-part-and-
dissents-in-part).27
22. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHiN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
23. See generally THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION (1970).
24. See generally David A.J. Richards, Free Speech As Toleration, in FREE
EXPRESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (W.J. Waluchow, ed., 1994).
25. See Molzof v. United Sates, 502 U.S. 301 (1992), in which Thomas authored a
unanimous decision confirming the federal government's liability for damages stemming
from an accident at a VA hospital. This was not only Thomas' first main opinion for the
Court, but also the first opinion he had written of any kind; he had not published any
concurrences or dissents prior to this case.
26. See Appendix, infra.
27. Hugo Black's numbers are as follows: he served thirty-four terms on the Court,
from 1937-1938 through 1970-1971. In that time, he wrote 501 main opinions, an
average of 14.73 per term. Of course, Black's tenure is part of an era when the Court was
usually deciding over 100 cases per term, and sometimes over 200. Today, the Court has
not decided more than 100 cases in a single term since 1995; by contrast, in Black's
tenure, the Court decided fewer than 100 case in a given term only twice (1949 and
2009] 421
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Clarence Thomas' Supreme Court Speech Opinions
Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox Television
Stations






Washington State Grange v. 128 S.Ct.
Main n/a n/a
Washington State Republican Party 1184 (2008)
551 U.S. 393




Athletic Association v. Brentwood Concur YES NO
Academy (a/k/a "Brentwood 2")
548 U.S. 521
Beard v. Banks Concur NO NO
(2006)
548 U.S. 230
Randall v. Sorrell Concur NO NO
(2006) ___
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 544 U.S. 550
Concur YES YES
Association (2005)
McConnell v. Federal Election 540 U.S. 93 Concur/Diss YES in part
Commission (2003) ent




Virginia v. Black Dissent YES n/a
(2002)
Borgner v. Florida Board of 537 U.S. Dissent (cert YES n/a
Dentistry 1080(2002) denial)
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties 535 U.S. 564 Main
Union (2002) (plurality)
Thompson v. Western States 535 U.S. 357 Concur YES YES
Medical Center (2002) _
1953). See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, & Thomas G. Walker, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 72-75 (4th ed.
2007).
Black wrote a total of eighty-one opinions in speech cases: twenty-one main
opinions, twenty concurrences, and forty dissents (including one dissent from a denial of
certiorari). Here again, context is required. During Black's tenure, the Court
comprehensively revolutionized libel law, and felt its way through several attempts to
define obscenity. Yet these spikes in speech cases occurred in the 1960's, when Black
had already been on the Court for two decades. Many of his concurrences and dissents
prior to 1960 were attempts to underscore the free speech dimensions of cases in which





Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) Concur YES NO
533 U.S. 525
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly (2001) Concur YES YES
Federal Election Commission v.
Colorado Republican Federal 533 U.S. 431
Dissent NO n/a
Campaign Committee (a/k/a (2001)
"Colorado 2")
U.S. Department of Agriculture v. 533 U.S. 405
Concur YES YES
United Foods (2001)




Shaw v. Murphy (2 Main n/a n/a
(2001)
529 U.S. Dissent (cert
Avis Rent-a-Car v. Aguilar YES n/a
1138 (2000) denial)
United States v. Playboy 529 U.S. 803
Concur YES YES
Entertainment Group (2000)
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 528 U.S. 377
Dissent NO n/a
Government PAC (2000)
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 527 U.S. 173
Concur YES NO
Association v. United States (1999)
Buckley v. American Constitutional 525 U.S. 182
Concur YES NO
Law Foundation (1999) Cocr YS N
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & 521 U.S. 457
Elliott (1997)
Denver Area Education
Telecommunications Consortium v. 518 U.S. 727 Concur/Diss NO NO
Federal Communications (1996) ent
Commission
Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. Federal 518 U.S. 604 Concur/Diss NO in part
Election Commission (a/k/a (1996) ent
"Colorado 1")
517 U.S. 484
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island Concur YES in part
(1996) ____
Capitol Square Review and 515 U.S. 753
Concur YES YES
Advisory Board v. Pinette (1995)
514 U.S. 476
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company Main n/a n/a
(1995)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 514 U.S. 334
Concur YES NO
Commission (1995) _________ ___
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Breaking down this raw data even further, the following is evident:
* Of his sixteen concurrences, seven of them were
opinions written when he refused to sign onto the main
opinion in the case, eight of them were opinions he
offered in addition to joining the main opinion, and one
was an opinion submitted when he was only willing to
join part of the main opinion;
* Of his sixteen concurrences fourteen were solo opinions
(as was one of his three concurrences-in-part-dissents-in-
part);
* Of his five "regular" dissents, only one was a solo
opinion (his two dissents from denials of certiorari were
solo efforts).
Finally, while this article will periodically delve into the philosophical
similarities and differences between Clarence Thomas and Antonin
Scalia on free speech, some data can be relayed now:
* Scalia signed onto four of Thomas' main free speech
opinions (all but Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party, in which Scalia
dissented);
* Scalia signed onto all eight of the Thomas free speech
concurrences, dissents, or partials that were not solo
efforts;
* Of these eight, five of them were also signed by Scalia
only (two were signed by Scalia and Rehnquist, one was
signed by Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy);
* Out of the twenty-nine full free speech cases in which
Clarence Thomas has written an opinion of some sort
(not counting the two cases in which Thomas dissented
from a denial of certiorari), Thomas and Scalia were on
the same side of the case twenty-five times; only in
Washington State Grange v. Washington State
Republican Party, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, and
424 [Vol. 114:2
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission did they find
themselves on opposite sides of a case.28
CLARENCE THOMAS ON SPEECH: JURISPRUDENTIAL BEGINNINGS
It was over three years into his tenure on the Court before Thomas
published his first free speech opinion. Thomas concurred in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission,29 in which the Court threw out a fine
assessed to a protestor who was anonymously leafleting against a
proposed school tax ballot initiative, in violation of a state ban on leaflets
that did not contain the name and address of the author or sponsoring
organization. 3 0 Agreeing with the result, but refusing to join John Paul
Stevens' majority opinion, Thomas gave his own reasons why the fine
was constitutionally impermissible.
Although Thomas conceded that there was no specific protection for
anonymous speech written into the First Amendment, his expansive look
at the history of anonymous speech showed that the Framers' era was
replete with anonymous pamphlets and newspaper columns, including, of
course, The Federalist Papers, written under the pseudonym "Publius."3
Amidst this lengthy disquisition on the place of anonymous speech in the
founding era, however, was a brief remark that stood as a portent of
Thomas' future writings.
The primary reason Thomas refused to join Stevens' opinion was
methodological. Stevens, as Thomas saw it, had committed the cardinal
sin of balancing. He had essentially weighed the public interest in
knowing the identity of political speakers (as well as the government's
interest in being able to regulate the conditions for ballot propositions)
against the interest of speakers to remain anonymous if they so desire.
The fact that Stevens had arrived at the correct result when balancing
these interest was of no moment. To Thomas, the problem with Stevens'
28. In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), Thomas takes the unusual step of
signing onto Scalia's concurring opinion, but also issuing his own solo dissenting
opinion. This case will be discussed in detail later in this article.
29. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
30. In an eerie coincidence, the Court's emphatic defense of the free speech rights of
the anonymous anti-government protestor was released on the same day that Timothy
McVeigh and Terry Nichols blew up the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City: April 19, 1995.
31. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring). Interestingly, Thomas
used this occasion to chide the historical references Stevens relied upon: "Whether 'great
works of literature' by Voltaire or George Eliot have been published anonymously should
be irrelevant to our analysis, because it sheds no light on what the phrases 'free speech'
or 'free press' meant to the people who drafted and ratified the First Amendment." Id. at
370.
2009] 425
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approach was that Stevens had sought in the first place to make a finding
"that anonymous speech has an expressive value both to the speaker and
to society that outweighs public interest in disclosure," 32 instead of
recognizing that a speaker's right to be anonymous was absolute (and
completely consistent with the history).
THE ICONOCLAST EMERGES: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
On the same day the opinion in McIntyre was released, the Court
announced its decision in a case that had been argued six weeks after
McIntyre's oral argument: Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company." This
case would be a landmark in Clarence Thomas' free speech
jurisprudence, and not just because it is the first main opinion on free
speech that he produces. More importantly, it is the beginning of an
extended and dissident path for Thomas on a subject which takes up
more than a quarter of his free speech output: commercial speech.
Back in 1942, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,34 the Supreme Court said
that advertising was not entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment. That decision, however, was casually written by Owen
Roberts, and did not evince much in the way of intellectual rigor.
Eventually, the Court's hostility towards advertising receded, but did not
completely evaporate. Starting in the early 1970's, the Court gradually
began feeling its way towards an alternative posture, leading to its 1976
decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council,35 in which it reversed course and announced that
commercial speech was entitled to some level of First Amendment
shelter, albeit not the complete protection afforded to noncommercial
speech. After struggling for a couple of years to formulate a
methodology that would pin down the different levels of protection, the
Court finally announced a four-part test for determining the
constitutionality of an advertising restriction, in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission ofNew York.36
32. Id.
33. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
34. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
35. Va. State. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens' Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
36. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980). The Central Hudson test is as follows: (1) the expression must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading; (2) there must be a substantial governmental interest
supporting the proposed regulation; (3) the regulation must directly advance the
governmental interest; and (4) the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary.
See id. at 566.
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Far from clarifying matters, though, Central Hudson seemed to
invite more confusion about the constitutional status of advertising.3
The one area that appeared to be settled was the Court's unanimous sense
that advertising was not entitled to the full protections of the First
Amendment. Clarence Thomas, in time, would shatter that unanimity,
and his opinion in Rubin was the first step down that road.
At issue in Rubin was a 1935 federal law prohibiting beer labels
from disclosing alcohol content. The stated reason for the law was to
prevent "strength wars" among brewers; if they could print alcohol
content on the label, this would give incentive for brewers to ratchet up
the proof of their product. In 1987, the Coors Brewing Company
submitted beer labels for governmental approval that disclosed alcohol
content anyway; when their label was rejected, they challenged the
constitutionality of the ban. Writing for a unanimous Court, Thomas
threw the ban out, but did so via a routine application of the Central
Hudson test.39
The following year, however, Thomas fired his first real shot in his
lonely commercial speech revolution, in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island.4 0 A Rhode Island law banning the advertisement of prices of
alcoholic beverages had been invoked against a liquor store that had
advertised prices on mixers and snack foods, and printed the word
"Wow!" next to a picture of vodka bottles. According to the state, d
implied bargain prices on alcohol, and a $400 fine was imposed. The
37. Over the years, the Court experimented with a "greater-includes-the-lesser"
approach which held that if government has the power to ban an activity outright (such as
casino gambling), then it can ban advertising of that activity even if it allows the activity
itself to remain legal, see Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986), only to later abandon that approach, see 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484 (1996). The Court also revamped the fourth prong into a general requirement of "fit"
between the comprehensiveness of the regulation and the seriousness of the stated
governmental interest. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989). Despite these periodic modifications, Central Hudson remains the rule for
commercial speech, much to Clarence Thomas' dismay, as we shall see.
38. Even after Virginia Pharmacy, William Rehnquist continued to insist that
advertising was not entitled to any First Amendment protection whatsoever, see Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S., 678 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). After
Central Hudson, Rehnquist was essentially forced to concede the partial First
Amendment protections afforded to commercial speech, but he still worked to undermine
those protections. See generally Posadas de P.R. Assocs., supra note 37.
39. Thomas disposed of the ban by pointing out that the government had other, less
onerous, means of preventing "strength wars," Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 490-91 (1995), and that the ban made no sense in light of other regulations on
alcohol sales, which included several state laws that required disclosure of alcohol
content. Id. at 488.
40. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 571 U.S. 484 (1996).
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Court threw out the ban and the state law, with John Paul Stevens
applying the standard Central Hudson test.
In a separate concurrence, however, Clarence Thomas announced
his philosophical objections to the test, and indeed to the Court's entire
line of commercial speech cases. Directly challenging the Court's
longstanding assumption that commercial speech was not entitled to the
full protections of the First Amendment, Thomas flatly declared, "I do
not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial
speech' is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial' speech." 4 1 In Virginia
Pharmacy Board, he pointed out, the Court had recognized that "'a
particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information' may be as keen, or keener than, his interest in 'the day's
most urgent political debate."' 4 2 In the intervening years, however, the
Court had only paid lip service to that sentiment. Now Thomas urged
that the Court should be more mindful of:
the importance of free dissemination of information about
commercial choices in a market economy; the antipaternalistic
premises of the First Amendment; the impropriety of manipulating
consumer choices or public opinion through the suppression of
accurate "commercial" information; the near impossibility of
severing "commercial" speech from speech necessary to democratic
decisionmaking; and the dangers of permitting the government to do
covertly what it might not have been able to muster the political
support to do openly.43
Thomas' emphatic opinion here in 44 Liquormart marks the emergence
of what should be described as a truly libertarian perspective on not only
commercial speech, but on the First Amendment writ large.
This libertarian perspective is also evident in a later commercial
speech case. In Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly,44 the Court unanimously
invalidated Massachusetts' regime of restrictions on the advertising of
cigarettes. Although Thomas joined Sandra Day O'Connor's main
opinion, he also contributed a separate concurrence. In a stark contrast to
O'Connor's technocratic approach, Thomas' concurrence reads like a
clarion call reminding readers of the role free speech plays as a weapon
against governmental overreaching:
No legislature has ever sought to restrict speech about an activity it
regarded as harmless and inoffensive. Calls for limits on expression
41. Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 518-19, quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
43. Id. at 520.
44. Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 535 U.S. 525 (2001).
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always are made when the specter of some threatened harm is
looming. The identity of the harm may vary. People will be inspired
by totalitarian dogmas and subvert the Republic. They will be
inflamed by racial demagoguery and embrace hatred and bigotry. Or
they will be enticed by cigarette advertisements and choose to smoke,
risking disease. It is therefore no answer for the State to say that the
makers of cigarettes are doing harm: perhaps they are. But in that
respect they are no different from the purveyors of other harmful
products, or the advocates of harmful ideas. When the State seeks to
silence them, they are all entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment. 45
On the topic of commercial speech, Thomas has been a model of
consistency, and a pointedly active one, at that. He has contributed an
opinion in each of the five more commercial speech cases that the Court
has decided since 44 Liquormart, and in each opinion he has restated his
opposition to the Court's commercial-noncommercial speech dichotomy.
In addition to his long opinion in Lorillard Tobacco, he has submitted
three other simple one-paragraph reminders that he rejects this
dichotomy.4 6 His dissent in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott,
Inc. ,4 though only a couple of paragraphs long, augmented his
objections to the dichotomy with an insistence that "paying money for
the purposes of advertising involves speech"4 8 .. . a statement that would
take on added resonance in another set of cases in which money and
speech intersect.
THE COURT'S WAR WITHIN: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Regulations on the role money plays in American electoral politics
date all the way back to the first decade of the 2 0th century. Alarmed at
the way William McKinley's campaign majordomo, Mark Hanna, had
overwhelmed the process with his innovative fundraising activities-and
prodded by McKinley's trust-busting successor, Teddy Roosevelt-
Congress passed the first major campaign finance law in 1907.49
45. Id. at 590 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
47. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
48. Id. at 504.
49. While it is understandable to view campaign finance regulation within the
Progressive tradition that was just gaining serious traction in American political life in
the first decade of the 2 0th century, the 1907 law, known as the Tillman Act, was a
product less of good-government reformism, and more of hard-edged economic
Populism. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000)). Its sponsor was South Carolina Senator
"Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, a coarse and unrepentant racist whose primary motivation in his
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Thereafter, a pattern emerged: Congress would pass major campaign
finance law; the campaign professionals would find the loopholes; the
loopholes would be ruthlessly exploited to the point that the law would
be toothless, at which point Congress would pass new major campaign
finance legislation, and the cycle would repeat. Periodically, the
Supreme Court would examine these laws, but they did not engage the
topic in a detailed and systematic way until their per curiam opinion in
Buckley v. Valeo,50 in which the Court invalidated significant portions of
the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of
1971. In Buckley, the Court made several tactical decisions about money
and politics that would play a dispositive role in its campaign finance
jurisprudence for decades.
One such decision was to refrain from categorizing political money
as "symbolic speech," which would have made it easier for restrictions
on political money to pass constitutional muster." Instead, the Buckley
Court depicted political money as pure speech, making political money
more resistant to regulation. Another decision the Court made was to
bifurcate political money into expenditures and contributions, and craft
different sets of rules for them.52 Expenditures of money to create
electioneering speech were deemed nearly untouchable by regulation; 3
contributions to candidates, on the other hand, were certainly expressions
of political support but also potential minefields for corruption, and were
consequently more susceptible to legitimate limitations.54
Neither of these tactical decisions was uncontroversial, and the
Court struggled for coherence and internal comity over them for several
years. Then, in the 1990's, open fissures on the Court were exposed in a
public and highly dramatic way, and Clarence Thomas was at the center
of the conflict.
In 1987, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
("CRFCC") ran a radio ad on incumbent Democratic Senator Tim Wirth
that would preoccupy the Court past the turn of the millennium. The ad
was a direct attack on Wirth by name, strafing him for his policies on
political career was to preserve the political influence of his poor white Southern
constituents. See generally STEPHEN KANTROWITZ,_BEN TILLMAN AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF WHITE SUPREMACY (2000).
50. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
51. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court laid out a
four-part test for "symbolic speech" that provided it with some level of First Amendment
protection while also enabling government to regulate the conduct if it was truly
problematic to the public welfare.
52. See 424 U.S. at 20-21.
53. The 1974 FECA amendments had imposed a spending cap on federal candidates;
Buckley threw this cap out.
54. See generally 424 U.S. at 26-38.
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taxes, balanced budgets, and military funding. Wirth and the Colorado
Democratic Party lodged a complaint with the Federal Election
Commission over the way the ad was funded, arguing that the standard
limits on contributions to candidates-limits that apply to political
parties-were not obeyed here. The ad had blown past the federal
contribution limits, but CRFCC pointed out that this was perfectly
acceptable, since at the time the ad ran, the Republican Party had not yet
settled on a nominee that would challenge Wirth in the 1988 general
election. Without a known opponent, the Republicans argued, the ad
could not be a contribution. The FEC, however, deduced that some
opponent down the road would eventually benefit from this ad, and thus
concluded that the ad was tantamount to a contribution and subject to
federal limits; the Republicans, having circumvented those limits, were
fined. But in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission, 7 the Court threw out the fine, and harshly
criticized the FEC's logic in imposing it in the first place. 8
Colorado 1 was Clarence Thomas' first campaign finance rodeo,
and he entered the fray with gusto. It is not an understatement, in fact, to
suggest that Thomas played a pivotal and even dominant role in the
escalation of conflict on the Court over the rules for-and constitutional
status of-political money.
Immediately, Thomas pronounced himself highly dissatisfied with
the Buckley framework, and specifically laid into that case's decision to
treat contributions and expenditures differently. While he joined Stephen
Breyer's 7-2 decision in part, Thomas also issued a separate opinion in
which he adopted a position that had been espoused by Warren Burger in
the original Buckley case, namely, that the distinction between
contributions and expenditures was utterly nonsensical and should be
eliminated:
55. See Charles Lane, Court Backs Limits on Campaign Spending; Justices Cite
Need to Curb 'Hard Money' Contributions, WASHINGTON POST, June 26, 2001. p. Al
(containing text of the advertisement).
56. Petitioner's Brief at *3, Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (No. 95-489).
57. Colo. Republican, 518 U.S. 604. This case is known as "Colorado 1," because,
as we shall soon see, the controversy over the anti-Wirth ad would return to the Court in
2001.
58. The FEC's position was so unsound as a matter of law that it prompted Burt
Neuborne, usually an enthusiastic backer of campaign finance restrictions, to comment
that "the FEC appears to have retained General Custer as its litigation consultant." Burt
Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 38 (1997).
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I believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously
upon freedom of political expression and association as do
expenditure limits. The protections of the First Amendment do not
depend upon so fine a line as that between spending money to
support a candidate or group and giving money to the candidate or
group to spend for the same purpose. In principle, people and groups
give money to candidates and other groups for the same reason that
they spend money in support of those candidates and groups:
because they share social, economic, and political beliefs and seek to
have those beliefs affect governmental policy.59
Thomas also stated flatly that the entire premise of Buckley-that some
regulations on political money were constitutionally acceptable-was
deeply flawed: "Broad prophylactic bans on campaign expenditures and
contributions are not designed with the precision required by the First
Amendment because they sweep protected speech within their
prohibitions."60
In so doing, Thomas became the first Justice to declare open war on
Buckley v. Valeo, at least from this direction. Buckley had had its critics
on the Court prior to Thomas, but those who had voiced dissatisfaction
with that decision objected because it did not allow enough regulation.'
Thomas was the first to suggest that Buckley needed to go because it
allowed too much regulation. Prior to this decision, even Antonin Scalia
had been of the opinion that "Buckley v. Valeo should not be overruled,
because it is entirely correct." 62 In Colorado 1, however, Scalia (and
Rehnquist) signed onto Thomas' sentiments.
59. Buckley, 518 U.S. at 640 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 642.
61. See Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 502-518 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Id. at 518-521
(Marshall, J. dissenting); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 303-
311 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 502-518 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 518-521 (Marshall, J. dissenting).




Four years later,63 the simmering tensions on the Court about
campaign finance boiled over, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PA C.64  There, the Court upheld Missouri's low ceiling on campaign
contributions as not violative of the Buckley v. Valeo framework, over
the protest of candidates and donors who argued that the ceiling was so
low that it impeded campaign speech. David Souter wrote for the Court,
commanding a 6-3 majority.
What makes Shrink Missouri such a remarkable decision is the
presence of trenchant attacks on the entire campaign finance
constitutional framework from both sides of the issue. In his
concurrence, John Paul Stevens emphatically contradicted one of
Buckley's central premises by declaring that "money is property; it is not
speech."65  Likewise, Stephen Breyer subtly suggested in his own
concurrence that the time may have come to strike Buckley from the
books and replace it with a structure that would tolerate more regulation
of political money.
However, calls to overrule Buckley came not only from the
concurring Justices, but also from the dissenting justices. Anthony
Kennedy archly called that decision a "half-way house," charged that
"Buckley has not worked," and declared, "I would overrule Buckley and
then free Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if,
based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is
possible to do so." 66
In his own dissent (which Scalia joined), Thomas was even more
uncompromising than Kennedy. He shared Kennedy's distaste for
Buckley, and agreed with him on the core of the problem. He did not,
however, see a need to give Congress or any state legislature a second
bite at the campaign finance apple:
63. In the interim, Thomas contributed another opinion about the First Amendment
and the political process, albeit one that did not have campaign finance overtones. In
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999), the Court
struck down a series of Colorado restrictions on the behavior of paid collectors for
signatures on state ballot initiative petitions (such as residency requirements, ID badges,
and funding disclosures). Although he agreed with the result, Thomas refused to join
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's majority opinion, and instead contributed a solo concurrence.
Ginsburg, Thomas averred, had replicated the mistake of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission: rather than declare that the behavior of the signature collectors was core
political speech that mandated the application of strict scrutiny, Ginsburg had applied
some loose lesser standard and balanced the free speech rights of the signature collectors
with the state's purported interest in protecting the integrity of the process. See 525 U.S.
at 206.
64. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
65. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 408-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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In the process of ratifying Missouri's sweeping repression of political
speech, the Court today adopts the analytic fallacies of our flawed
decision in Buckley v. Valeo (per curiam). Unfortunately, the Court
is not content to merely adhere to erroneous precedent. Under the
guise of applying Buckley, the Court proceeds to weaken the already
enfeebled constitutional protection that Buckley afforded campaign
contributions. In the end, the Court employs a sui generis test to
balance away First Amendment freedoms.
Because the Court errs with each step it takes, I dissent. [O]ur
decision in Buckley was in error, and I would overrule it. I would
subject campaign contribution limitations to strict scrutiny, under
which Missouri's contribution limits are patently unconstitutional.
Thomas' dissent was the most comprehensive attack on the very notion
of campaign finance laws' constitutionality that had ever been produced
by the Supreme Court. Unlike his opinion in Colorado 1, which was
focused only on the fatuities of the contributions-expenditures
distinction, Thomas' Shrink Missouri dissent was a thorough
deconstruction of every major principle justifying regulation that Buckley
announced. And unlike Kennedy, whose critique left the door open for
renewed attempts to constitutionally square the campaign finance circle,
Thomas insisted that the entire gambit was illegitimate and irreparable.
As is the case in his commercial speech opinions, Thomas has been
consistent over time in his treatment of campaign finance restrictions.
Furthermore, just as he brooks no deviation from the absolutist idea that
commercial speech is as immune from regulation under the Free Speech
Clause as noncommercial speech, he repeatedly insists that any
restrictions on campaign finance are constitutionally infirm. When the
Court revisited the controversy over the Tim Wirth attack ad in 2001,
Thomas once again maintained that restrictions on campaign finance
(like restrictions on advertising) are direct challenges to First
Amendment freedoms and should be subjected to strict scrutiny.6' He
also restated this position in a minor case, Federal Election Commission
v. Beaumont,69 before broadening his attack in the Court's gargantuan
appraisal of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002.70
67. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n, 533
U.S. 431, 465-66 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (hereafter known as "Colorado 2") (The
case was necessitated by CRFCC's argument that even political party expenditures that
are coordinated with candidates cannot be regulated. The Court rejected this argument).
69. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164-65 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
70. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.).
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That legislation, popularly known as McCain-Feingold after the two
senators who sponsored it, was a dramatic overhaul of the campaign
finance system. Passed as a replacement for the crippled FECA,
BCRA's major provisions included elimination of so-called "soft
money" (the unlimited donations that could be made to political parties,
instead of directly to candidates), rules for how "issue ads" could be
financed when they are broadcast close to election day, increases in the
contribution ceilings (which had remained static, unadjusted for inflation,
since the 1970's), and creation of an equalization structure that would
allow financially outgunned candidates to play by a more indulgent set of
contribution rules when challenged by wealthy opponents dipping into
their personal fortunes to fund their campaigns.7  The law was several
years in incubation, and upon its final passage was met with a myriad of
legal challenges which were consolidated into one massive case,
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.72
After the case's tortuous journey through the lower federal courts,
the Supreme Court in McConnell upheld most of BCRA's new rules.
While there were small parts of the decision with which Thomas
concurred, his separate opinion was spiritually a dissent. And it was a
notably angry one, at that: "[T]he Court today upholds what can only be
described as the most significant abridgment of the freedoms of speech
and association since the Civil War." 74
It may be, in fact, that Thomas' anger got the better of him in this
case. Testimony that Congress had solicited when formulating BCRA
71. Id.
72. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
73. BCRA contained an acceleration provision designed to facilitate a response from
the Supreme Court in time for the 2004 election cycle, but this plan was thwarted by the
unconscionable actions of the special panel of lower federal judges who had to hear the
case first. From the start, it was patently obvious that the opinions of District Judges
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly and Richard Leon, and Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson,
would have little impact on the ultimate determination of BCRA's constitutionality; this
panel was merely a necessary formalistic step on the path to the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, Henderson, Kollar-Kotelly, and Leon took a full five months after oral
argument to issue their ruling, a delay that contributed considerable uncertainty to the
campaigns and candidates who were all waiting to find out the operable rules for the
upcoming elections. As bad as the delay was, the end product was exponentially worse:
Henderson, Kollar-Kotelly, and Leon produced an opinion that was 1,638 pages long, and
which required a four-page spreadsheet to summarize the specific holdings of each
individual judge. See generally McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F.Supp.2d 176
(D.D.C. 2003). The holdings would not have even an iota of constitutional importance
once the Supreme Court weighed in. Given that it is a basic requirement of a judge to be
understandable, and given that this should occur within a reasonable economy of words, a
suggestion that Henderson, Kollar-Kotelly, and Leon committed a gross violation of their
professional duties in this case would not be indefensible.
74. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 264 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
2009] 435
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
revealed that many of the largest and most active political donors had
been making contributions to both the Democrat and the Republican in a
given race.75 To Congress, this signified that the contributions were less
about the donor's expression of a political point of view, and more about
a desire to insure that whoever won the election would owe the donor a
favor ... which would later be repaid in the form of access.
Thomas, however, had long insisted that campaign contributions
were the expressions of the donor's political ideals, and not merely a
tawdry transaction that was perhaps the smallest of steps beyond the
payment of "protection money" to organized crime. Here, in the face of
a literal mountain of contrary evidence, Thomas clung to that ideal, to a
degree that defied logic:
The two major parties are not perfect ideological opposites, and
supporters or opponents of certain policies or ideas might find
substantial overlap between the two parties. If donors feel that both
major parties are in general agreement over an issue of importance to
them, it is unremarkable that such donors show support for both
parties. This commonsense explanation surely belies the joint
opinion's too-hasty conclusion drawn from a relatively innocent
fact.76
Until this case-and surely, even after it-Thomas' free speech
jurisprudence had been marked by an elegant clarity of vision and polite
but firm impatience with artificial distinctions. Here, however, Thomas
simply blinded himself willfully to the realities of everyday politics, and
to the implications of his own principles: if political contributions are an
expression of ideological will and desire to see a preferred candidate win,
then no person in his right mind would support both alternatives. The
real commonsense explanation is that double-givers are doing something
besides giving voice to a political idea via their gifts: they are buying
influence with whomever may be in a position to transact it.
Not all of Thomas' work in his McConnell opinion was
intellectually dubious, however. Interestingly, Thomas in McConnell
pushed the envelope of his absolutism, and did so in a way that did not
defy basic logic. BCRA had also imposed new requirements vis-A-vis
the disclosure of campaign contributions, and fully eight members of the
Court saw the disclosure rules as constitutionally permissible. Thomas,
however, had by now arrived at an even more doctrinaire view of the
First Amendment (perhaps because by now he had seen his views on
75. See generally Expert Report of Thomas E. Mann, Sept. 20, 2002, at TABS 5-6.
See also McConnell v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 509 (D.D.C. 2003)
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
76. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 271-72.
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commercial speech and campaign finance fail to achieve enduring
majorities on the Court). Alone among his colleagues, Thomas
considered the disclosure rules to be violative of core free speech
principles. Expanding his arguments from McIntyre, Thomas saw forced
disclosure as yet another injury to the principle that individuals are
allowed to express themselves anonymously.
It is a common observation that the intersection of money and
speech makes application of the First Amendment significantly more
complicated. This observation is not only borne out by simple logic, but
it is manifested in the meandering Supreme Court case law on
commercial speech and campaign finance. Yet amidst this
jurisprudential incoherence, the work of Clarence Thomas stands out for
its uncluttered lucidity.
OBSCENITY AND THE MEDIA
As disjointed as the Supreme Court's work on commercial speech
and campaign finance has been, those lines of cases look like holistically
consistent truisms when compared to the Court's work on obscenity.
Perhaps more than any other set of cases, the Court's obscenity
jurisprudence has been pockmarked by confusion, false starts, and course
corrections. If ever there was a case law that would sorely test a Justice
committed to consistency and simplicity, this would surely be it.
Yet even here, Thomas' simple approach persists. To be fair,
Thomas arrived on the Court well after the major internecine battles on
obscenity had -been fought (the end result of those battles, one could
argue, is that all of the Justices lost).77 By the early 1990's, the Court
seemed to have successfully retired the issue; unable to develop an
enduring and persuasive definition of exactly what constituted obscenity,
the Court simply moved on to other subjects. When the Court has dared
to take up the topic of obscenity in the last two decades, they have not
confronted obscenity on its face, but rather as a component in a hybrid
situation, such as the extent of the Federal Communications
Commission's regulatory authority,78 or the way obscene material can be
disseminated using new communicative technologies such as the
internet.79 In this respect, Thomas has had the good fortune of avoiding
the byzantine dynamics of the obscenity issue on its own terms. The
structure of the obscenity cases that have come before the Court in
77. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
78. See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
79. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Thomas' era, in a sense, dovetailed conveniently with Thomas' habit of
breaking cases down into their simplest components and proceeding
from that point.
Simplicity, however, does not necessarily lead to consistency. And
it is here, unlike in the campaign finance and commercial speech cases,
that Thomas' jurisprudence evinces some minor wobbles. While most of
his output in obscenity cases is of a piece with his overall constitutional
libertarianism, there are moments when Thomas' desire for simplicity
induces him to accept at least the concept of paternalistic regulation.
Thomas' first foray into the law of obscenity occurred in 1996's
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission,o in which the Court invalidated
the Helms Amendment, a federal law that let cable operators ban
"indecent" material from public access channels, and required that such
material be scrambled if it is made available on their systems (though
subscribers had to be allowed to request that the material be
unscrambled). Although Thomas concurred with part of Stephen
Breyer's main opinion,8' his opinion was primarily a dissent.
At first glance, the position that Thomas takes here seems to be
unusually censorial for him; he is in a way standing for a law that makes
it harder for speech to travel freely. Yet a careful reading of Thomas'
opinion demonstrates that it fits in rather snugly with his libertarian
approach to free speech. As Thomas framed the case, the core question
it posed was not whether indecent material could be restricted, but rather
"how and to what extent the First Amendment protects cable operators,
programmers, and viewers from state and federal regulation."82 The
main threat to individual rights was not the Helms Amendment; instead,
the main threat was the other laws that government could promulgate in
the absence of the Helms Amendment. Without this law, Thomas
surmised, government could essentially force cable operators-private
businesses-to offer speech to which they objected."
In past cases, this possibility would have been accepted as
unremarkable. It had been well-settled that government has more
regulatory power over the broadcast airwaves than over print media.
This power was justified by the finite broadcast spectrum (as opposed to
the limitless universe of print). Absent governmental regulation,
80. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n.,
518 U.S. 727 (1996).
81. Specifically, Thomas agreed with Breyer's methodology in determining what
constitutes obscene material. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Constortium, 518 U.S.
727 at 812.
82. Id. at 812.
83. See generally id. at 820-823.
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competition for desirable frequencies would result in broadcasts
crowding each other out, rendering the airwaves useless to the public
interest. 84 For decades, then, the Court had operated on the assumption
that the different characteristic of broadcast media and print media
required different approaches to regulation.
Ever the simplifier, Thomas questioned the validity of this
assumption, and the utility of the distinction that gave rise to it. Just as
he refused to countenance the false dichotomies of contributions and
expenditures, or commercial and noncommercial speech, Thomas did not
see any constitutional value in dividing up media into print and broadcast
spheres; instead, he advised, all media should be treated the same . .. and
should be regarded as heavily protected from governmental interference.
"The text of the First Amendment makes no distinctions among print,
broadcast, and cable media," he commented, "but we have done so."8
The unique features of cable television should not make it more
susceptible to government meddling, and to Thomas, the Helms
Amendment (even though it was, technically, government action itself),
was designed to keep government out of the media's business.
For those who would question the sincerity of Thomas' position
here, and suggest that it is nothing more than a beard to enable
governmental censorship of sexually-oriented material, consider his
subsequent position in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc. 86 In that case, the Court reviewed a law that, on its face, resembled
portions of the Helms Amendment that had survived scrutiny in Denver
AETC: it required that adult material be segregated to a separate
channel, scrambled, and shown only during late evening hours when
children were unlikely to be watching. This time, however, the Court
deemed that the law had gone too far, and was restricting material that
was merely indecent, and not obscene.
While the law's sponsors were probably hoping that their legislative
net would sweep up both obscene material and indecent material, the
Constitution only countenances bans on the former, and not the latter.
Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion stressed this point, as did Thomas'
concurrence.87  Having joined the main opinion, Thomas evidently
decided to emphasize his own distaste for governmental paternalism:
"The 'starch' in our constitutional standards cannot be sacrificed to
accommodate the enforcement choices of the Government."88
84. See Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,
279-80 (1933).
85. Denver AETC, 518 U.S. at 812.
86. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
87. See id. at 811 (Kennedy, J.), 829 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 830 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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However, in subsequent obscenity cases, Thomas has periodically
catered to those very enforcement choices. While he has maintained his
suspicions about governmental regulatory discretion, he has also at times
deferred to established bureaucratic prerogatives. Most recently, in
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 89
Thomas joined Antonin Scalia's opinion upholding the FCC's discretion
to sanction broadcasters who allow the airing of "fleeting expletives." 90
For Scalia, this was a simple matter of administrative law: the FCC has
been granted wide latitude to regulate the use of indecent language on
television; in crafting the policy, the FCC adhered to all relevant
administrative standards; and the policy was well-known to those outlets
that would fall with its reach. Theoretically, a libertarian-to-the-nth-
degree would not tolerate such bureaucratic paternalism, but by joining
Scalia's opinion, Thomas was unwilling to directly challenge the FCC in
this case.
Then again, as his concurrence revealed, Thomas' patience with
FCC paternalism was by no means limitless. In fact, some time in the
future we may look back on Thomas' opinion as a first step in the
direction of a full-scale reappraisal of the very foundations of FCC
regulations on broadcast content. Echoing his complaint from over a
decade earlier in Denver AETC, Thomas reminded the Court that the
distinctions between print and broadcast media were artificial ones, and
were likely constructed for the sole reason of enabling governmental
regulation over electronic communications that would be prima facie
intolerable for print.9 '
Thomas then went a step further. Where Scalia's opinion had been
exclusively hung on questions of administrative law-and had
completely deemphasized any First Amendment questions-Thomas
confronted the free speech dynamics of the case directly, and suggested
in his opening paragraph that a broad reconsideration of two important
cases might well be warranted in the near future.
I write separately, however, to note the questionable viability of the
two precedents that support the FCC's assertion of constitutional
authority to regulate the programming at issue in this case. Red Lion
and Pacifica were unconvincing when they were issued, and the
passage of time has only increased doubt regarding their continued
validity.92
89. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009).
90. Id. at 1809.
91. See id. at 1820 (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1820 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
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Calling those two cases a "deep intrusion into the First Amendment
rights of broadcasters, which the Court has justified based only on the
nature of the medium," 93 Thomas bemoaned the legal centrality the
Court had assigned to "transitory facts,"94 and signaled that he was "open
to reconsideration of Red Lion and Pacifica in the proper case."95
Thomas' impatience in Fox Television Stations with the way
technological realities can be deployed to alter the meaning and scope of
the First Amendment was of a piece with his prior observations in the
field. In 2002's Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, Thomas concurred
with the majority's decision to invalidate the Child Pornography
Prevention Act, on the grounds that it seemed to be exploiting the advent
of the internet and sophisticated computer graphics software as a means
of criminalizing indecent speech that was clearly protected by the First
Amendment. 9 6
One month later, in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,97
Thomas authored a plurality opinion concerning a lower court injunction
on the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998.
Congress had passed COPA after the Court had thrown out its previous
attempt to regulate the flow of indecent material over the internet, the
Communications Decency Act, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union9 8 as fatally overbroad. Here, as in Denver AETC, Thomas took a
nuanced approach to the subject, appearing to tolerate, at least in spirit,
some form of regulation of objectionable material while simultaneously
fitting this regulatory indulgence into his overall philosophy on speech.
In Denver AETC, the guiding principle that Thomas insisted he was
safeguarding was freedom; specifically, the freedom of broadcasters not
to be compelled to disseminate material they did not wish to
disseminate.99 In this case, the guiding principles for Thomas were his
93. Id. at 1820.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1823.
96. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 259-60 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). The CPPA targeted so-called "virtual child pornography"-sexually explicit
material that appears to involve children, but which is created via computer imaging; no
actual live children are exploited or harmed to generate the material.
97. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
98. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
99. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 816
(1996) ("It is the operator's right that is preeminent.... [W]hen there is a conflict, a
programmer's asserted right to transmit over an operator's cable system must give way to
the operator's editorial discretion.") (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
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devotion to simplicity of legal rules and an aversion for artificial
distinctions that would enable over-regulation.too
The ACLU's primary objection to the law was its use of the
customary "community standards" approach to determining obscenity. 01
That approach could conceivably work when the material is a magazine
on a newsstand physically located in a town, but the internet, the ACLU
maintained, took the very concept of community into a brand new
dimension. Material available on the web is available to anyone with a
connected computer. Adhering to the rote "community standards"
approach could mean that one particular community which is maniacally
disturbed by any sexually explicit material (including material on safe
sex) could claim that its standards were violated by having that material
available on the internet connections beamed into their homes, and could
effectively impose its standards on the country at large. Because of the
possibility that the customary approach could compel websites to
conform to the standards of the most repressed community, the ACLU
maintained that COPA's use of the community standards approach
rendered it facially invalid.10 2
To Thomas, then, here was yet another attempt to capitalize on the
allegedly unique vicissitudes of a communicative medium, and invoke
them as a justification for changing the established rules of the game.
Admittedly, the ACLU's gambit was an attack on established rules as a
means of combating a speech restriction rather than justifying it, but in
Thomas' eyes, the problem was no less acute. Rejecting the ACLU's
argument that new technology must mean new rules, Thomas declared
that the "community standards" approach to obscenity would stand, and
that there was essentially nothing so distinctive about the internet that
required treating it differently under the First Amendment than other
communicative media.10 3
At the same time, though, Thomas left the injunction against COPA
in place. While the new law was not nearly as overbroad as its deeply
flawed predecessor, Thomas pointedly refused to rule on the overbreadth
100. See id. at 813-14 ("Our First Amendment distinctions between media, dubious
from their infancy, placed cable in a doctrinal wasteland in which regulators and cable
operators alike could not be sure whether cable was entitled to the substantial First
Amendment protections afforded the print media or was subject to the more onerous
obligations shouldered by the broadcast media.").
101. That standard was announced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
102. See Reno, 521 U.S. 844 at 877-78 ("Moreover, the "community standards"
criterion as applied to the Internet means that any communication available to a nation-
wide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be
offended by the message").
103. See id. at 583.
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question (and thus the injunction went undisturbed).10 4 With the Court
having disposed of the facial challenge to COPA, Thomas sent the case
back down to the lower courts for a determination on whether the
injunction was defensible on overbreadth grounds. After the lower court
found that the law probably was fatally overbroad (and that success on
the merits at trial was likely), that decision was appealed up the ladder to
the Supreme Court, which upheld that conclusion in 2004 in an opinion
written by Anthony Kennedy and joined by Clarence Thomas. 05
CLARENCE THOMAS' PHILOSOPHY OF FREE SPEECH
Some who have studied Clarence Thomas' career have dismissed
him as nothing new under the sun. In addition to the popular mythology
that he is nothing more than a clone-or a lapdog-of his energetic
conservative colleague Antonin Scalia, 06 there are those who depict
Thomas as fundamentally an imperfect impersonation of long-gone
judicial and political actors. Christopher Smith and Joyce Baugh, for
example, have argued that "In many respects, Thomas' judicial
philosophy mirrors the themes of the U.S. Supreme Court's critics during
the middle decades of the twentieth century." 0 7 Thomas is also often
derided as uncurious. Much is made of his devotion to silence during
oral argument, with one recent observer pointing out that it has been over
three full years since Thomas asked a question from the bench. 08
As the first part of this article has shown, though, Clarence Thomas
is a distinctive voice on the First Amendment. While his free speech
104. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). Following that
decision, the inevitable trial on the merits was held. COPA was indeed found to be
overbroad. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa.
2007), affd, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008); Mukasey v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 129 S.
Ct. 1032 (2009). Thus, the Court killed off COPA for good in early 2009, over a decade
after the never-enforced law was first passed.
106. Of course, the well-documented empirical evidence-including similarity scores
and paired votes-of Thomas' symbiosis with Scalia is more than mere mythology.
107. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS:
CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 45 (2000).
108. See Adam Liptak, Rare Glimpse of Thomas, from Bench to Den, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2009, at All. Of course, Thomas' silence may simply be a manifestation of a
belief that the limited time in oral argument really should be left to the lawyers to make
their case, and not to the Justices to fulminate. "If I invite you to argue your case," he has
said, "I should at least listen to you." ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A
BIOGRAPHY 471 (1st ed. 2001).
Here too, Thomas shares something in common with Hugo Black, who was also not
inclined to dominate oral arguments with his own interjections. When asked about this
by Harry Blackmun, Black wryly responded, "if you don't ask many questions, then you
will not ask many foolish questions." KEvIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME
DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS 311 (2007).
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jurisprudence shares much with some of his predecessors and
contemporaries, in many respects Thomas has advanced an uncommon
and even iconoclastic vision. His absolutist posture on free speech
renders him a unique presence on the present-day Court.
So what are the contours of Thomas' absolutism? Is Thomas
simply Hugo Black's old wine in a new bottle?
In certain senses, there is little connection at the roots of the two
men's absolutism. Consider one recent account of Black's philosophy:
Black's absolutism, far from being a simplistic idolization of the
amendment's words, was grounded in a sophisticated linking of
normative views about the role of the judiciary with reflections on the
assumptions implicit in the creation of constitutional texts as well as
with a (quite underdeveloped) historical claim about the First
Amendment's origins. 109
Thomas, by contrast, has ruminated publicly about the role of courts in
the American political system much less frequently than Black did. For
Thomas, this subject is a periodically interesting avenue of exploration;
for Black, this subject was the backbone of his entire professional code.
Meanwhile, where Black's grasp of the original understandings behind
the First Amendment may have been "underdeveloped," Thomas'
disquisitions in this area are comprehensive and defining."'0
Furthermore, while both men's legal philosophies are likely
offshoots of their broader views on the role of government, they could
hardly come from more different perspectives, especially in their
worldview on the relationship between the state and the economy. Hugo
Black, preternaturally suspicious of big business, was an ardent Senate
champion of governmental efforts to spur economic recovery,"' to the
point that, in the words of a prominent biographer, "Hugo Black was a
New Dealer before there was a New Deal.""12  Clarence Thomas, in
contrast, is preternaturally suspicious of governmental attempts to induce
109. DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 259 (Stanford Law Books 2009) (2009).
110. Whether they are historically accurate is, of course, an entirely different matter.
I merely mean here that Thomas has undertaken copious efforts to explore the intentions
of the Framers and to work his conclusions about their intentions into his jurisprudence.
To the extent that Black did this as well, he did so in a casual and at times assumptive
manner. For Thomas, divining the Framers' intentions is the fulcrum of his entire
jurisprudence.
111. Though he had his limits; Black was no fan of the National Recovery Act, the
centerpiece of Franklin Roosevelt's legislative strategy that was shot down by a
unanimous Court two years before Black arrived, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also NEWMAN, supra note 21, at 160.
112. NEWMAN, supra note 21, at 157.
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individuals to make sacrifices for what government deems to be the
greater economic good.
In fact, it would be entirely fair to describe Thomas as an acolyte of
classic economic libertarianism. 13 Ayn Rand, in particular, is a
recurring muse; as chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Thomas convened regular showings of the 1949 film
version of Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead for his staff, a practice that he
continues on the Court every year for his clerks.' 14  Likewise, F.A.
Hayek is a common and perhaps more prevalent inspiration. In a speech
he gave several times in the mid-and-late-1990's, Thomas would follow
up a reference to James Madison's Federalist No. 10 declaration that
government's main job is to protect "the diversity of faculties in men"
with an immediate bow to Hayek for the idea that "the chief aim of
freedom is to provide both the opportunity and the inducement to insure
the maximum use of the knowledge that an individual can acquire."015
While it is clear that philosophies like those of Rand and Hayek are
highly influential on Thomas' thinking, exactly how that influence
operates is somewhat murky. Hayek saw regulation of the free market as
a political act first and foremost; a means of backstopping a governing
regime that could easily gravitate towards totalitarianism once the
camel's regulatory nose was in the tent."'6  Thomas rarely echoes
Hayek's apocalyptic pronouncements, but he often refers to
governmental interference with property rights as the main obstacle to
individuals' development, which was an intermediate prong in Hayek's
overall philosophy.1 7 The core question, though, is whether Thomas is
preoccupied with the political consequences of economic regulation (as
Hayek was), or the economic consequences of political regulation.
Consider Thomas' dissent in Kelo v. City of New London,
Connecticut,'18 in which the Court upheld the controversial seizure of a
113. A reference to him as a political libertarian, however, would suffer from a
massive internal contradiction; as Thomas himself has wondered aloud, "if I were a true
libertarian I wouldn't be here in government." Bill Kauffinann, Clarence Thomas,
REASON, Nov. 1987, at 31.
114. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 163.
115. See Clarence Thomas, The James McClure Memorial Lecture in Law, Delivered
By the Honorable Clarence Thomas, 65 Miss. L.J. 463, 465 (1996); Clarence Thomas,
Victims and Heros [sic] in the "Benevolent State," 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 673
(1996); Clarence Thomas, Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENT U. L. REv. 317, 318
(2000) (citing FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960)).
116. See generally HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
117. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 81 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Like the majority, I believe that 'individual
freedom finds tangible expression in property rights."').
118. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
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number of houses to make way for private economic development of the
New London, Connecticut waterfront. Stressing the broad civic benefits
of the waterfront development, the majority in Kelo saw the taking as a
valid "public use" that allowed for the invocation of eminent domain.
Most of Thomas' dissent proceeded along what are for him boilerplate
grounds-he began with an exploration of what the Framers meant by
the term "takings," and examined the ways in which the Takings Clause
had been understood over time." 9
But in the final section of his dissent, Thomas subtly questioned
even the Framers' vision. The Framers clearly embraced governmental
seizures of private property that would generate significant public
benefits, as long as strict rules were followed. Yet even after tracing the
Framers' toleration of these seizures, Thomas suggested this toleration
was misguided:
So-called "urban renewal" programs provide some compensation for
the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the
subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the
indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the
government to take property solely for public purposes is bad
enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass
any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall
disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not
only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and
best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.120
This is as close as Thomas comes to a full-metal Hayekian viewpoint; he
is suggesting here that the true danger is a government that does not
respect boundaries, and that cannot be trusted to formulate good
judgments.
At the same time, though, by stating his desire to protect poor
communities which lack sufficient political clout, Thomas here sounded
like at least an unreconstituted New Dealer, if not a Great Societitian.
He also struck a note completely at odds with his previous takes on the
influence that of wealth exerts on the political process.
In McConnell, for example, Thomas denounced arguments that
campaign finance laws were justified as a means of leveling the political
playing field between rich and poor, sarcastically insisting that:
[t]he only effect ... that the "immense aggregations" of wealth will
have (in the context of independent expenditures) on an election is
that they might be used to fund communications to convince voters to
119. See id. at 505-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
446 [Vol. 114:2
BLACK LIKE ME
select certain candidates over others. In other words, the "corrosive
and distorting effects" . . . are that corporations, on behalf of their
shareholders, will be able to convince voters of the correctness of
their ideas.' 21
Yet Thomas' dissents in Kelo and McConnell are perfectly
consistent in one important way that illuminates his overall free speech
philosophy. At its core, Thomas' economic libertarianism is a proxy for
general disdain of governmental regulation. Thomas is a flaccid
celebrant of markets, but an energetic critic of controls. To the extent
that Thomas does embrace the free market, he does so only for its ability
to nourish individual freedom and growth (as opposed to its ability to
generate wealth and national progress).122
This philosophy explains his position on commercial speech.
Thomas believes advertising is constitutionally valuable on its own
terms, as information which facilitates economic decision-making by
consumers.123 Concomitantly, Thomas views governmental attempts to
restrict advertising through a Hayekian lens as invasions of individual
decisional autonomy with potentially darker political overtones. Indeed,
Thomas's overall jurisprudence is representative of contemporary
neoconservative hostility towards the regulatory state. One Thomas
biographer has described Thomas' concurrence in United States v.
Lopezl24 as reflective of "his true desire: launching a full-scale rebellion
against the rulings of the New Deal era."' 25 In this respect, Thomas is
about as far removed from Hugo Black-the "New Dealer before the
New Deal"-as someone could possibly be.
Their philosophical differences on economic matters
notwithstanding, Hugo Black and Clarence Thomas occupy the common
ground of a vision of the First Amendment that is pointedly resistant to
incursions at its margins. Each has insisted that the authors of the First
Amendment intended for it to be a breathtakingly broad provision, based
121. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 274 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Put another way, on a continuum of 20 th century economists, Thomas'
libertarianism is much closer to George Stigler than to Arthur Laffer.
123. This is a particular note of dissonance between Thomas and Hugo Black. During
the Court's long, slow journey from Chrestensen to Virginia Pharmacy, Black at one
point sniffed that it was demeaning to apply the First Amendment to a merchant "selling
pots." Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
124. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
125. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 505. This is not to say that Thomas' enmity for
regulation is ever-present in his jurisprudence. In his concurrence in F.C.C v. Fox, for
example, Thomas questions the continuing validity of the technological justifications for
the F.C.C.'s rules, see 129 S.Ct. at 1821-1822, but does not cross the Rubicon of
questioning the F.C.C.'s institutional legitimacy (even though such a question would not
have been inconsistent with his main argument).
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on their immediate history with a British crown eager to silence dissent
from an ocean away. Each has refused to tolerate internal tinkering with
the rules of free speech, disdaining "'ifs,' 'buts,' or 'whereases,"' or any
artificial tests designed to legitimate governmental intrusion into matters
of conscience, or any suggestion that the right to free speech could be
bargained away in exigent times.
While comparisons between Clarence Thomas and Hugo Black are
easy to come by, it is much more difficult to locate Thomas' free speech
jurisprudence along the traditional theoretical continuum of First
Amendment analysis. Thomas clearly shares little commonality with the
view, most famously advanced by Thomas Emerson, that "[t]he proper
end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a
human being," and thus, "freedom of expression is essential as a means
of assuring individual self-fulfillment."' 26 Emerson's perspective, which
has been critiqued in some quarters as rationalizing self-indulgence with
"an unseemly ring of hedonism,"l 27 is far too disorderly and
unencumbered by rules to be resonant in Thomas' uncomplicated
schema.
Nor does Thomas appear to value the individual right to freedom of
speech as a means of protecting non-mainstream ideas or individuals
from being overrun by a stampeding majority. David Richards'
"toleration model" depicts free speech as a control over not so much
government, but rather over an inflamed democratic mob.12 8 Drawing
heavily from the work on John Hart Ely,129 Richards argued that free
speech safeguards "the democratic political process from the abusive
censorship of political debate by the transient majority who has
democratically achieved political power."' 30 Thomas, however, does not
speak much to the problem of tyranny of the majority.
If there is one traditional theory of free speech that is reflected in
Thomas' jurisprudence, it is the work of Alexander Meiklejohn, an
unsurprising observation considering the title of Meiklejohn's 1961
essay, "The First Amendment is an Absolute."' 3' But it is Meiklejohn's
landmark 1948 work, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
126. EMERSON, supra note 24, at 6.
127. RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 9 (1992).
128. See generally DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, Free Speech As Toleration, in FREE
EXPRESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (W.J. Waluchow, ed., 1994).
129. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
130. RICHARDS, supra note 128, at 34.




Government,'32 that gives us a pathway into Clarence Thomas' thinking.
Meiklejohn argued that free speech is necessary in a democracy because
it is the people, and not the institutional elite, that retain the real
decisionmaking power on public affairs. In order the make those
decisions properly, however, the people need reliable information to
guide their collective thought processes: "The welfare of the community
requires that those who decide issues shall understand them, and this in
turn requires that ... all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall
be fully and fairly presented."13 3
Like Meiklejohn, Thomas sees free speech through a lens of
purposiveness. It is not, as Emerson would posit, a good and an end in
itself. Rather, free speech to Thomas and to Meiklejohn is designed to
accomplish something: the facilitation of popular decisionmaking.
Meiklejohn's instrumentalism, however, was cabined by the
boundaries of the democratic process. He saw free speech as merely an
avenue via which a democratic polity could acquire the information that
it required in order to make its choices in political affairs. Notably,
Meiklejohn's original formulation of free speech did not account for
artistic speech, which he deemed a purely private matter that did not
merit First Amendment concern. 134
Thomas similarly posits that free speech exists so as to allow for
good decisions on public affairs, only he does not limit his conception of
public affairs to politics. As his concurrence in 44 Liquormart made
clear, Thomas considers individual decision-making on private economic
matters to be of equal import as individual decision-making on public
political issues. To Thomas, governmental interference with private
economic decision-making is irrevocably noxious-it is polluting the
waters of freedom with unconscionable paternalism. Worryingly,
Thomas saw this pollution as being countenanced by his own Court, and
was not shy about chastising his colleagues over their apostasy:
[Since Central Hudson], the Court has appeared to accept the
legitimacy of laws that suppress information in order to manipulate
132. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), available at http://digicoll.library.wisc.edulUW/
subcollections/MeikFreeSpAbout.html.
133. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23, at 25.
134. Chastened by critics who characterized his theory as insufficiently speech-
protective, Meiklejohn eventually shoehorned protection for artistic speech into his
theory. His ultimate argument was that exposure to art and other forms of high-value
private speech would make a person more well-rounded, which would in turn enable a
person to be a better citizen, which would in turn lead to better democratic
decisionmaking overall. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
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the choices of consumers-so long as the overnment could show
that the manipulation was in fact successful.
One observer has commented that Thomas' opinion in 44 Liquormart
"was one of the staunchest defenses of economic liberty in the Court's
history, and an opinion that no doubt would have pleased Ayn Rand
immensely."'
36
More tellingly, Meiklejohn's instrumentalism was collective in
nature-free speech enables a polity to make good decisions for its own
governance. There is nothing collective at all in Thomas'
instrumentalism. His focus on economic decisionmaking by consumers,
in fact, is as relentlessly individualistic as any theory Thomas Emerson
might advance. As the most recent chronicler of Thomas' jurisprudence
has pointed out:
Prior to Justice Thomas's dissent in Glickman, only one other case in
Supreme Court history had used the words 'collectivization'/
'collectivize.' . . . Thomas' use of them in Glickman demonstrates
that he is explicitly aware of the fundamental ethical/political
distinction between individual rights (e.g., freedom of speech) and
collectivism (e.g., the government's de facto takeover of the fruit-
growing industry)-and that, at least regarding free speech, he is
unwilling to allow the individual rights (e.g., those of the fruit
growers) to be subordinated to the government's perceived need for
'orderly' fruit markets.1 37
Perhaps it is best to say that where Meiklejohn's conception of free
speech is yoked to participatory democracy, and where Emerson's
conception is about self-actualization, and where Richards' conception is
about safeguarded dissidence, Thomas' conception is simply a
vindication of core libertarian principles: exalting individual autonomy,
recognizing that human instincts for self-maximization can serve valid
social ends, limiting governmental ability to interfere with self-
maximization.
Thomas' libertarian streak is probably most pronounced in his
campaign finance opinions. In his Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC
dissent, he framed his assault on Buckley v. Valeo as follows:
135. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 521 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
136. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 524.
137. HOLZER, supra note 6, at 133-34. In this respect, Thomas fits in seamlessly on a
current Court that has, in the eyes of many observers, bent over backwards to advance a
free-market-friendly version of the Constitution that is determinedly receptive to the
needs and wants of the business community. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc.,
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, March 16, 2008.
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Political campaigns are largely candidate focused and candidate
driven. Citizens recognize that the best advocate for a candidate (and
the policy positions he supports) tends to be the candidate himself.
And candidate organizations also offer other advantages to citizens
wishing to partake in political expression. Campaign organizations
offer a ready-built, convenient means of communicating for donors
wishing to support and amplify political messages. Furthermore, the
leader of the organization-the candidate-has a strong self-interest
in efficiently expending funds in a manner that maximizes the power
of the messages the contributor seeks to disseminate.138
Additionally, his opinion for the Court in Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Partyl3 9 can also be seen through a
libertarian prism. Following the Court's invalidation of California's
"blanket primary" in California Democratic Party v. Jones,140
Washington state, which used a similar system, proposed new
procedures. The new system in Washington would retain some
characteristics of the old blanket primary-all candidates were placed
into a big pool; voters could vote for any candidate regardless of their
party affiliation; the top two vote-getters advanced to the general
election-but would require that candidates list their party affiliations on
the primary ballot, and forbid them from changing their affiliations
between the primary and general elections. The state's Republican Party
charged that the proposed system would violate their rights of free
association, because the primary victors would be perceived to be the
official standard-bearers of the party.
But stressing the freedom of individual choice, and the capacity of
self-reliant voters to figure things out for themselves,141 Thomas rejected
this argument. Because this system does not select a party's nominee in
any official way, associational rights are not really threatened:
[R]espondents' assertion that voters will misinterpret the party-
preference designation is sheer speculation.... There is simply no
basis to presume that a well-informed electorate will interpret a
candidate's party-preference designation to mean that the candidate is
138. Nixon v. Shrink Miss. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 414-16 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
139. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (2008).
140. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
141. This is another link between Thomas and Meiklejohn. As the latter's biographer
has pointed out, "For Meiklejohn, the only way to justify a faith in democracy as a form
of self-government was to trust in the essential goodness of human beings, to believe in
their ability to abide by shared rules of deliberation, to protect their dignity as free and
morally responsible citizens." ADAM R. NELSON, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE
MEANING OF ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN 1872-1964, 269-70 (2001).
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the party's chosen nominee or representative or that the party
associates with or approves of the candidate.142
It must be pointed out, though, that, Thomas has not quite been an
absolutist in all free speech situations. Another characteristic that he
shares with Hugo Black is that both men had their limits, but instead of
expressing those limitations by shading certain things inside an area of
free speech by using some sort of balancing test (such as saying that
some commercial speech will be protected but some other commercial
speech will not be protected), both Thomas and Black would
operationalize their limitations in a meta-systemic way by declaring the
First Amendment wholly inapplicable.
The most obvious synchronicity between Black and Thomas is in
the area of student speech. In 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,14 3 the Court invalidated the suspension of
two students who had worn armbands to school in protest of the war in
Vietnam. Writing for a 7-2 Court, Justice Abe Fortas underscored the
decision in a famous remark, "it can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."l44
Hugo Black, however, was one of the dissenters,145 and voiced his
displeasure in portentous terms:
Change has been said to be truly the law of life but sometimes the old
and the tried and true are worth holding. The schools of this Nation
have undoubtedly contributed to giving us tranquility and to making
us a more law-abiding people. Uncontrolled and uncontrollable
liberty is an enemy to domestic peace. We cannot close our eyes to
the fact that some of the country's greatest problems are crimes
committed by the youth, too many of school age. School discipline,
like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training
our children to be good citizens-to be better citizens. Here a very
small number of students have crisply and summarily refused to obey
a school order designed to give pupils who want to learn the
opportunity to do so. One does not need to be a prophet or the son of
142. Wash. State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1193. Because Washington State Grange had
been brought as a facial challenge to the new rules before they had ever been used, there
was no evidence in the record that voters would be confused the way the Republicans
alleged. See id Thomas grudgingly conceded that evidence to this effect could emerge
after the system had been in effect for a number of election cycles, but emphatically
refused to make the assumption that it would happen, and invalidate the system on that
ground. See id. at 1193-94.
143. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
144. Id. at 506.




a prophet to know that after the Court's holding today some students
in Iowa schools and indeed in all schools will be ready, able, and
willing to defy their teachers on practically all orders. This is the
more unfortunate for the schools since groups of students all over the
land are alread running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins,
and smash-ins.
So here was Hugo Black, insistent avatar of the notion that the Free
Speech Clause brooked no exceptions, suddenly and crankily announcing
that the First Amendment could be kept outside of the schoolhouse gate.
His colleagues were shocked, 14 7 but perhaps they should not have been.
For Black, this issue may have been less jurisprudential than personal.
He was already bemoaning the decline of America's civic institutions
and moral code, as this passage clearly indicates, and was assigning
blame for that decline on ill-mannered young people who were
rambunctiously protesting the actions of their elders. And as one of
Black's biographers has pointed out, in the middle of the Court's
deliberation in Tinker, Black's grandson was suspended by his high
school for publishing and distributing an underground newspaper. 14 8
Justice Black was already increasingly distraught over the wave of
transgressions being committed by America's youth. For him to
discover that his own family was not immune from this development
would have been undoubtedly traumatic, and it is not hard to imagine
that this trauma affected his judgment in Tinker, which is an anomaly in
his otherwise consistent expansiveness on First Amendment freedoms.
Although Fortas' dictum has endured as a classic constitutional
soundbite, its value as governing law has ebbed with time. In the
decades after Tinker, the Court backtracked markedly on the question of
civil liberties in schools, and allowed school administrators to censor
school newspapers, 14 9 suspend students for off-color remarks at a school
assembly,150 and compel students to undergo drug testing as a condition
for participating in interscholastic athletics."'
146. Id. at 524-25 (Black, J., dissenting).
147. See NEWMAN, supra note 21, at 592.
148. Id.
149. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
150. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
151. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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This retrenchment reached its apex in 2007 in Morse v. Frederick.152
Students at a high school in Juneau, Alaska were allowed to leave school
one afternoon in early 2002 to watch the Olympic torch relay travel
through town on its way to the Salt Lake City Olympics. As the torch
passed by, a group of students (in an apparent effort to get on television)
unfurled a giant banner with the words "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" on it.
The school's principal immediately ran over to the students and ordered
them to remove the banner, on the grounds that it could be interpreted as
advocating illegal drug use. One student, Joseph Frederick, refused this
order, and was summarily suspended; he appealed this suspension all the
way to the Supreme Court. But writing for a 6-3 Court, John Roberts
upheld the suspension, on the grounds that school administrators have
the authority to restrict speech contrary to the school's mission that is
offered during school activities (and the excusal for attending the torch
relay was considered to be a school activity).
While Roberts' opinion paid lip service to the Tinker idea that
students do enjoy some degree of guaranteed civil liberties while in
school, Thomas' solo concurrence took another line, and averred that
"the standard set forth in Tinker . .. is without basis in the
Constitution." 53  Thomas undertook a detailed examination of the
history of public education in the United States, and concluded that at no
point prior to Tinker were schoolchildren's rights ever deemed to trump
the notion of in loco parentis, which assigned a virtual parenting function
to school officials during the school day.
And like Hugo Black nearly forty years earlier, Clarence Thomas
made a substantive appraisal of the intellectual capabilities of students,
and concluded that they were lacking. Indeed, as with Black, Thomas
saw student speech as nothing more than casual defiance. "Frederick
asserts a constitutional right to utter at a school event what is either
'[g]ibberish,' . . . or an open call to use illegal drugs," Thomas huffed.
"To elevate such impertinence to the status of constitutional protection
would be farcical."l 5 4
Clarence Thomas' determination to temper his vision of the First
Amendment by declaring it inapplicable in schools is out of character
152. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). Given the Court's recent ruling in
Safford United Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, supra note 17, however, it seems that the
Court's retrenchment on student constitutional rights has been braked, at least for the
moment. It is worth restating that in Safford, only Thomas was prepared to go the full
Hugo Black route and give the school unfettered discretion to combat rumors of student
possession of legal drugs.
153. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 421.
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vis-A-vis his normal free speech absolutism. But it is not the only
exception.
THE OUTLIER: THE "OTHER" BLACK: VIRGINIA V. BLACKl 55
On August 27, 1998, a Ku Klux Klan rally was held at a farmhouse
in rural southern Virginia. The Klansmen were there at the invitation of
the owner of the farmhouse (who participated in the rally), which was
located in a clearing some 350 yards away from the nearest road. At the
end of the rally, a 25-foot-tall cross was set on fire. While the rally was
visible to onlookers off in the distance, it had occurred on private
property, and accounts of the rally indicated that the cross-burning was
purely ceremonial; the traditional ending to a Klan gathering.
Under Virginia law, however, it was still illegal:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be
burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public
place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a cross shall
be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group
156
of persons.
After a brief investigation, the leader of the rally, Barry Black, was
arrested, and ultimately convicted and fined $2,500.
Back in 1992, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,'57 the Court had
invalidated a St. Paul municipal hate speech ordinance on the grounds
that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination. In that case-in
which a band of allegedly intoxicated teenagers burned a cross in the
front yard of a neighborhood black family-Antonin Scalia drew a
distinction between criminalizing cross-burning as a civic expression of
antipathy for the racism inherent in the message, and criminalizing acts
of intimidation and harassment (of which cross-burning could certainly
be an example).'58  St. Paul's poorly-written ordinance, however,
represented the former.
The Virginia law, which defines cross-burning as intimidation,
seemed at first glance to avoid the infirmity that doomed the St. Paul
law. But in Virginia v. Black, the Court threw out Barry Black's
conviction. Sandra Day O'Connor's main opinion made it clear that
Virginia was perfectly within its authority to ban intimidating cross-
burnings. Virginia could not however, assume that every cross-burning
155. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
156. Id. at 349.
157. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
158. Id. at 391-397.
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is an act of intimidation. Tracing the history of the Klan, O'Connor
determined that such an assumption was unwarranted: "As the history of
cross burning indicates, a burning cross is not always intended to
intimidate. Rather, sometimes the cross burning is a statement of
ideology, a symbol of group solidarity. It is a ritual used at Klan
gatherings, and it is used to represent the Klan itself."1 59 Virginia's law,
via the "prima facie," clause, incorporated this very assumption, and did
so with practical consequences, since it governed jury instructions. 160
Jurors receiving the "prima facie" instruction were essentially being told
to assume that the cross-burning was illegal. In addition to creating a
presumption which burdened the defendant and not the government with
the task of rebutting it, the clause skewed prosecutions by effectively
creating a hanging jury; inviting jurors to view cross-burning in only a
negative and hurtful light. 61
Virginia v. Black, with its record of a "non-intimidating KKK cross-
burning," resembles a creative law professor's final exam hypothetical
come to life. O'Connor's analysis of the situation was clearly correct.
Unlike in R.A. V, in which a black family was targeted and a message of
hate and fear was planted on their front lawn, in Virginia v. Black no
blacks (or any potential targets of the Klan's pathologies) were exposed
to the cross-burning. This was clearly a mere ceremony, and it was
clearly expressive conduct.
The decision in R.A. V. was unanimous; the decision in Virginia v.
Black nearly so. There was one lone dissenter . .. Clarence Thomas.
For those who attended oral argument, Thomas' solo dissent was
not an unanticipated development. During the presentation of Deputy
Solicitor General Michael Dreeben, arguing in favor of the law's
constitutionality, the normally-mute Thomas broke his silence:
I indicated, I think, in the Ohio case that the cross was not a religious
symbol and that it has-it was intended to have a virulent effect.
And I-I think that what you're attempting to do is to fit this into our
jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly what the cross was
intended to accomplish and, indeed, that it is unlike any symbol in
our society .. . there was no communication of a particular message;
it was intended to cause fear, and to terrorize a population.162
159. Black, 538 U.S. at 365-66.
160. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1983), invalidated by Black, 538 U.S. 343.
161. Black, 538 U.S. at 366; see also id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring).
162. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (No. 01-1107), available
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1107/argument (last visited
Sept. 14, 2009); 2002 WL 31838589 at *23.
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For a free speech absolutist such as Clarence Thomas, the decision
in this case should have been obvious. Distasteful as Barry Black's
behavior was, it was also expressive in nature. The cross-burning was
part of the initiation ceremony for a group that is defined by a belief
system (noxious though those beliefs may be to most people). And
unlike in R.A. V., there was no hated "target" in the vicinity; nobody at
whom the burning cross was directed. Thomas, however, abandoned his
usual absolutism, and pointedly declared that there is nothing expressive
about cross-burning:
I believe that the majority errs in imputing an expressive component
to the activity in question. In my view, whatever expressive value
cross burning has, the legislature simply wrote it out by banning only
intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular means. A conclusion
that the statute prohibiting cross burning with intent to intimidate
sweeps beyond a prohibition on certain conduct into the zone of
expression overlooks not only the words of the statute but also
reality. 163
Much as certain justices in 1989 would have preferred to declare that flag
burning was simply an exception to the First Amendment and its partial
protection of symbolic speech,1 64 Thomas argued that the Court should
disregard the communicative dimension of cross-burnings and empower
state and local governments to call it as they saw it; intimidation, and
nothing more:
[T]his statute prohibits only conduct, not expression. And, just as
one cannot burn down someone's house to make a political point and
then seek refuge in the First Amendment, those who hate cannot
terrorize and intimidate to make their point. In light of my
conclusion that the statute here addresses only conduct, there is no
need to analyze it under any of our First Amendment tests.165
163. Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Here again is some (possibly
attenuated) common ground with Hugo Black. Black dissented in Street v. N. Y, 394 U.S.
576 (1969), in which the Court invalidated the conviction of a black veteran who had
burned an American flag upon learning of the assassination attempt on civil rights activist
James Meredith, and remarked "if they can do that to Meredith, we don't need no damn
flag." Street, 394 U.S. at 579. Rejecting the majority's suggestion that Street had been
convicted for his words, Black announced simply that flag-burning was not protected by
the First Amendment .. . much in the same way that Thomas would declare that cross-
burning was not protected by the First Amendment. Compare Street, 394 U.S. at 615
(Black, J., dissenting) with Black, 538 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (dissents of William
Rehnquist (joined by Byron White and Sandra Day O'Connor) and John Paul Stevens).
165. Black, 538 U.S. at 394-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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This is obviously an instance in which Thomas' analysis should be
subjected to critical examination, especially since he was making a
provocatively counterintuitive argument that an action which Barry
Black and his fellow Klansmen intended to be expressive-and certainly
thought was expressive-was not expressive at all. In effect, Thomas
bent reality so it would fit with his general philosophy about speech: as
long as he could say that a ceremonial cross-burning is not expressive
conduct, then he could tolerate laws which proscribe it; were he to
concede that there is an expressive dimension to a ceremonial cross-
burning, then he could not tolerate regulation of it while being consistent
with his view of free speech. Unfortunately, none of the limited
assessments of Thomas' jurisprudence address this. 166
Just as Thomas' remarks during oral argument were unusual, the
emotional tone of his written opinion was a departure from his accepted
habits. A large portion of his opinion, like O'Connor's opinion, was
devoted to a historical analysis of cross-burning. Unlike O'Connor's
opinion, though, Thomas' opinion at times read as personal testimony on
the horrors of the practice and what it portended. Coming from a man
with a well-known zeal for privacy and equally-well-known disdain for
infusing professional work with personal unburdenings, Thomas' written
opinion in Virginia v. Black was just as out of character as his outburst
during its oral argument. His opinion is such a dramatic departure for
Thomas that it prompted one astonished observer to identify him as "the
Justice in Black whose view most closely resembles that of the critical
,,167race theorists....
Another commentator has offered up a different explanation for
Thomas' role:
Although Justice Thomas dissented from the Black Court's holding
and judgment, he agreed with Justice O'Connor that the harms of
cross burnings should be recognized and assessed by the Court in
construing and applying the First Amendment. Far from a novel
development, this interpretive approach is consistent with and is the
latest in the line of Court decisions justifying the regulation of certain
speech by reference to harm. This harm-valuation analytic, so
prominent in Black and so conspicuously absent in R.A. V., was a
critical factor in Black's constitutional calculus. ... 168
166. The 2002 update of Scott Gerber's FIRST PRINCIPLES does not discuss Virginia v.
Black at all; Holzer's 2007 book KEEPER OF THE FLAME merely reports on Thomas'
gambit without offering any sort of critique, positive or negative.
167. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross-Burnings, Epistemics, and the
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 577 (2005).
168. Ronald Turner, Cross Burnings and the Harm-Valuation Analytic: A Tale of Two
Cases, 9 BERKELEY J. AFR. L. & POL'Y 3, 30 (2007).
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The problem, however, with describing Thomas' approach as a
manifestation of a harm-valuation analytic is that this would be the only
case in which he was cognizant of the harm dynamic. Indeed, in his
sardonic concurrence in Lorillard Tobacco, Thomas dismissed
Massachusetts' explanation that their restrictions on speech were
justified by the damage that tobacco products can cause, at one point
going so far as to speculate that such an argument could also be extended
to alcohol and fast food.16 9
There may be one additional way to explain Thomas' free speech
idiosyncrasies. Perhaps we can summarize his philosophy on speech as a
rejection of balancing approaches to the First Amendment. Whereas
other Justices are periodically prepared to concede that something is
speech, but there is nevertheless some exception to the First Amendment
that allows for it to be regulated, if Clarence Thomas believes that
something is speech, then it is protected in a near-absolute fashion.
Thomas' method of excepting things out of the First Amendment is
simply to declare that the thing being litigated is not really speech. This
methodology is apparent in Virginia v. Black, for example, and it is also
a way to describe his solo dissent in a case early in his tenure, Dawson v.
Delaware.170
In Dawson, an 8-1 Court threw out the death sentence given to a
member of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang on the grounds that
introducing Dawson's membership in the gang at the sentencing phase of
his murder trial was akin to punishing him for his beliefs, and thus
violative of the freedom of association dimension of the First
Amendment. Thomas, however, saw the introduction of Dawson's
Aryan Brotherhood affiliation as merely an attempt by the prosecution to
rebut Dawson's assertions of good character; it was evidence that he had
engaged in illegal activity while in prison on a previous conviction, in
contrast to his proffered claim of being a model prisoner.
While it is possible to explain Virginia v. Black and Dawson v.
Delaware in a race-neutral way-in both cases, something that the other
eight Justices saw as speech was, to Thomas, not speech at all-it is not
insignificant that the times in which Thomas has opted to declare
something to be "not speech" have both been cases in which the
defendant's white supremacist attitudes have been a central concern. It
should also be pointed out that in Dawson, Thomas regarded the
defendant's racial beliefs as substantive evidence of poor character:
169. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587-90 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
170. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The description of the Aryan Brotherhood as a "racist" prison gang
conveyed additional information about Dawson's character. ... Even
if Dawson's white racist prison gang does not advocate "the murder
of fellow inmates," a jury reasonably could infer that its members in
one way or another act upon their racial prejudice.17 1
If we are trying to find a way to explain the times in which Thomas
departs from his otherwise consistent First Amendment outlook as
something other than a personal reaction to anti-black racism, his opinion
in Dawson makes that task harder, not easier. In the end, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that Thomas' work in the racially-charged case of
Virginia v. Black is an outgrowth of his life experiences as an African-
American man, experiences which induced him to depart from his
normal techniques and perspectives in free speech cases.172
If Thomas was indeed operating within a personal-is-political
epistemology in Virginia v. Black, as some have argued,173 here would be
at one final note of similarity between Thomas and Hugo Black. Just as
Black seemed to inject something personal (his family life) into his
dissent in Tinker, so too did Thomas infuse his entire thought process in
Virginia v. Black-oral argument and written dissent-with his own
personal life experiences. At a time in which the nomination of Sonia
Sotomayor to the Supreme Court is generating alarm in politically
conservative circles out of fear that she will be too willing to inject her
personal worldview into her constitutional interpretation, 1 74 we can see
that one of the lodestars of legal conservatism was not immune to the
seductive pull of such a decisional rubric.
CONCLUSION
The famed civil libertarian Nat Hentoff, who ordinarily would not
be expected to have a high opinion of Clarence Thomas or his
171. Id. at 173.
172. It must be pointed out that Thomas signed onto Scalia's majority opinion in
R.A. V. More importantly, Thomas had written his own concurrence in Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), in which the Court upheld a
lower court directive for the Board to issue a permit for the Klan to display a cross during
the holiday season at Columbus' Statehouse Plaza, which was a designated public forum
(this was the "Ohio case" that Thomas mentioned to Michael Dreeben). Pinette,
however, hinged on the Board's determination that displaying of any cross-Klan-
proffered or otherwise-might have violated the Establishment Clause, and had refused
to issue the permit on those grounds. However, in his separate concurrence, Thomas
pointed out that "to the extent that the Klan had a message to communicate [via the cross]
in Capitol Square, it was primarily a political one." Id. at 771.
173. See generally Charles, supra note 167.
174. See Peter Baker and Neil L. Lewis, Sotomayor Vows 'Fidelity to the Law' as




jurisprudence, has nevertheless acknowledged that Thomas' record on
the First Amendment is emphatically speech-protective. "To the
incremental surprise and perhaps discomfiture of some of his critics,
Justice Clarence Thomas is growing harder to stereotype," Hentoff has
commented. "[H]e has written as boldly and uncompromisingly in
celebration of the First Amendment as did Justices William 0. Douglas
and William Brennan Jr. in days of yore."175
Thomas' free speech jurisprudence is not without its flaws, but it
can fairly be said to be as exemplary as Hentoff describes it. While
attitudinally similar to the absolutism of Hugo Black, and somewhat
influenced by the instrumentalism of Alexander Meiklejohn, Clarence
Thomas' work on free speech stands on its own as a distinctive and
embracive reading of the First Amendment.
175. Nat Hentoff, First Friend: Justice Clarence Thomas Has Written as Ardently in
Defense of Free Speech as Liberal Icon William Brennan Jr. Ever Did, L. TIMES, July 3,
2000, at 62.
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APPENDIX: CLARENCE THOMAS OPINIONS DATA
Of Clarence Thomas' 432 opinions, there are 149 main opinions,
140 concurrences, 112 dissents (including dissents from denial of
certiorari), and thirty-one concurrences-in-part-and-dissents-in-part. The
total of 149 main opinions, which averages out to 8.76 main opinions per
Term, places him at the bottom of the list of the five Justices who have
been on the Court for the entire balance of Thomas' tenure:
Main Opinions Authored, 1991-92 Term
Through 2008-09 Term
JUSTICE MAIN OPINIONS RATE PER TERM
John Paul Stevens 173 10.17
Antonin Scalia 170 10.00
Anthony Kennedy 158 9.29
David Souter 151 8.88
Clarence Thomas 149 8.76
In addition, William Rehnquist wrote 151 opinions between the start of
the 1991-1992 Term and his death on September 3, 2005 (averaging just
over ten main opinions per Term). Sandra Day O'Connor wrote 145
main opinions between the start of the 1991-1992 Term and her
retirement effective date of January 31, 2006 (averaging exactly ten main
opinions per Term).17 6
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